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tion, the Maryland statute requires an act to be performed
or committed within the state. The cases reviewed herein
show almost conclusively that such an act within the state
constitutes sufficient "minimum contact" to satisfy the requirements of due process of law.
GILBERT ROSENTHAL

Maryland Fair Trade Laws Do Not Prohibit Advertising

In Maryland Of Goods To Be Sold Elsewhere
Bissell CarpetSweeper Co. v. Master Mail Order Co.1
Plaintiff manufacturer had established minimum retail
prices for his products in Maryland pursuant to contracts
with Maryland dealers in conformity with the Maryland
Fair Trade Act.2 Defendant operated a retail store in the
District of Columbia, a free trade jurisdiction, with about
one-third of its sales consummated by mail order. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin defendant from "willfully and knowingly
advertising and offering for sale"' in Maryland plaintiff's
products at prices lower than the aforesaid valid fair trade
prices in effect in Maryland. None of defendant's sales took
place in Maryland; all sales were directly to consumers;
and all advertising emanated from the District of Columbia.
The district court denied the injunction,4 and on appeal, was
affirmed. "Since the prohibition against selling (in Sec. 107
of the Maryland Act) is of necessity confined to Maryland
sales, the associated acts of advertising or offering for sale
must likewise be concerned with sales within the State","
and the McGuire Act 6 does not broaden the scope and purpose of the Maryland statute.'
1240 F. 2d 684 (4th Cir., 1957).
'Md. Oode (1951) Art. 83, Secs. 102-110.
'1bid, Sec. 107, is the basis for plaintiff's cause of action:
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered
into pursuant to the provisions of Sections 102-110, whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such
contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby."
'140 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md., 1956).
'Supra, n. 1, 687-8.
i15 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 45(a) (1)-(5). In substance the Act renders
lawful contracts prescribing minimum prices for the resale of certain trademarked commodities, provided such contracts are lawful by statute in a
state "in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to
be transported for such resale". Also permitted is "any right of action
created by any statute ...
which in substance provides that willfully and
knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less
than the price" prescribed in such fair trade contracts is unfair competition. Further, the making of such contracts or enforcement of the aforesaid rights of action shall not be a burden on interstate commerce.
ISupra, n. 1, 688.
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The Court's attention was focused primarily on the intended meaning and scope of the Maryland Act. The result
reached is based on two concepts: (1) That the Maryland
Act must be strictly construed for it is in derogation of the
common law ;8 and (2) the doubt as to the constitutionality
of a state statute which attempts to control interstate
commerce.
The application of these concepts to this situation seem
to the writer to be unsound. As to the first, such a narrow interpretation contradicts the purpose of fair trade
legislation - which is to protect the good will and name of
the product.' Fair trade legislation permits a producer to
establish and maintain a minimum retail price for his
product. By so doing, the producer is able to establish in
the public mind that his trademark represents a certain
standard of quality and value. ° If, however, the public is
led to believe that the product can be bought for less than
the price nationally advertised, the good will which fair
trade legislation protects is adversely affected." This is not
to say that the Maryland statute should be construed to
prohibit advertising at less than Maryland fair trade prices
anywhere, 2 but only to prohibit such advertising within
the borders of Maryland. A "strict" statutory construction
should also be fair and reasonable. 3 A fair and reasonable
interpretation is not one which tends unnecessarily to defeat the purpose for which a statute was enacted.
The Court's disinclination to enjoin defendant's advertising in Maryland was also due to the thought that a state
statute regulating interstate commerce might be unconstitutional. There is ample authority that this fear is unnecessary. No doubt advertising from the District of Columbia
into Maryland is a form of interstate commerce." However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state
may prohibit a certain activity where Congress has removed the bar of the commerce clause so that the state law
may stand even though it would otherwise fail as interfer-

0Venable v. J. Engel & Co., Inc.,

193 Md. 544, 549, 69 A. 2d 493 (1949).
9 Schill v. Remington Putnam Co., 179 Md. 83, 89, 17 A. 2d 175 (1941).
10 See Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836, 837 (D. C. Md.,
1953), for the Court's consideration of the effect advertising has on the
formation of the good will of the trademark.

2 Krupsaw v. Luskin, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 10th Ed., par. 68,228, p.

71,293 (Cir. Ct. of Balto. City, 1956).
" Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F. 2d 684
(4th Cir., 1957). Also for the lower court decision, supra, n. 4, 174. The
Court apparently felt that plaintiff was contending for such an interpretation.
'Garrity v. District of Columbia, 86 F. 2d 207, 214 (D. C. Cir., 1936).
u Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U. S. 143, 151 (1951).
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ing with interstate commerce. " As stated by the Supreme
Court, Congress can "permit the states to regulate the (interstate) commerce in a manner which would otherwise not
be permissible". 6 Congress, through the McGuire Act, has
permitted state fair trade statutes "to apply to... activities
in or affecting interstate ... commerce"."7 That Maryland
has the power to enjoin defendant's advertising within its
borders, if given Congressional sanction, seems undeniable.
But the Court refers' to the case of Miller Bros. v.
0
Maryland,"
which held invalid a Maryland statute requiring out-of-state vendors to collect and remit to the state a
use tax on articles sold outside the state, where said articles
are to be used in Maryland. The statute was held to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no
sufficient link between the state and the vendor to meet
the due process test of reasonableness of the tax collecting
burden placed on the vendor. The Miller Bros. case stated
that ".... due process requires ...some minimum connection
between a state and... the property ... it seeks to tax".20
Here, defendant's advertising activities are operative within Maryland. Their being part of interstate commerce has
significance only if the McGuire Act has not removed the
bar of the commerce clause.
Prior to the enactment of the McGuire Act in 1952, state
Fair Trade Laws offered immunity from the federal laws
prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade only to the extent provided by the Miller-Tydings Act.2 ' In 1951, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Sunbeam
Corp. v. Wentling" that the Miller-Tydings Act did not
give the states the power to provide such immunity with
respect to interstate sales; therefore, the Pennsylvania
Fair Trade Act (substantially the same as the Maryland
Act) was not intended to apply to sales and advertisements
made from Pennsylvania into other states. The next year
the McGuire Act was passed, Section 4 of which provides
that the making and enforcing of fair trade contracts ("lawIn re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891) ; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,
U. S. 190 (1915) ; Clark Distilling Co. v. West'n Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S.
(1917) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936) ; Ky. Whip & Collar
v. I. C. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 (1937); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
U. S.408 (1946).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945).
715 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 45(a), note, "Purpose of Act".
Supra, n. 12, 688.
D347 U. S. 340 (1954), noted, 14 Md. L. Rev. 376 (1954).
Ibid, 344-5.
'15 U. S. C. A. (1951), Sec. 1. This statute is substantially identical to
the first two paragraphs of the McGuire Act.
185 F. 2d 903 (3rd Cir., 1950).
15

238
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Co.
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ful as applied to intrastate transactions") "shall (not)
constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or interfere with, commerce". Consequently, in 1953, the District
Court in Maryland did enjoin a Maryland vendor from selling to a Delaware vendee at less than the established fair
trade price in Maryland." Judge Chesnut stated, "The language of subsection 4 (of the McGuire Act) seems very
clearly to indicate that . . . Congress was expressing its
public policy to the contrary of the Wentling decision on
that point".24 The Wentling decision proceeded on the
assumption that since the states had no power to regulate
such interstate sales, the state statute did not intend to
reach them. On the other hand, once Congress supplied
the power in the McGuire Act, Judge Chesnut assumed
that the state statute was intended to reach these sales
(even though the state statute antedates the federal by
about 15 years). The question still remains, however,
whether section 4 of the McGuire Act also works in reverse,
i.e., in the fact situation presented by the instant case,
wherein the advertisements are made from a non-fair trade
into a fair trade jurisdiction. This question, too, was presented to Judge Chesnut in Revere Camera Company v.
Masters Mail Order Company,2 1 and there he decided that
"... the McGuire Act does not of itself relate to the subject
matter of the sale of goods from a non fair trade jurisdiction into another jurisdiction . . ."I Similarly, in the instant case, Judge Watkins in the District Court stated that
"... the McGuire Act intended only to permit any State
that so desired to authorize the making of contracts fixing
minimum resale prices with respect to goods resold in that
State, or transported into such State for resale"." In the
instant case, the Circuit Court goes no further than to construe the Maryland statute as not applicable to the facts.
Ample practical justification for the result may lie in
a reasonable statutory interpretation of the intended scope
of the McGuire Act itself. While it is a difficult problem to
discover the Maryland legislature's intent regarding the
Maryland Act, it is clearly possible to reason that Congress
did not intend to give the states such vast control over interstate advertising as would have resulted if the Bissell
Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836 (D. C. Md., 1953).
"Ibid, 842. In addition the House Committee Report in regard to the
McGuire Act is quoted therein to the same effect.
128 F. Supp. 457 (D. C. Md., 1955).
- Ibid, 462.
21Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 140 F. Supp. 165,
178 (D. C. Md., 1956). The Court pointed out that the word "resale" was
interchangeable with the word "sale". Italics supplied.
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case had reached the opposite conclusion and accepted the
plaintiff's contention. It has been held that Congress gave
to the states at least the power to control sales and advertising from their own states elsewhere.2" To conclude that
the states can also control sales and advertising into their
jurisdictions might lead to more serious complications. For
example, District of Columbia newspapers enjoy a wide circulation in nearby Maryland communities. Moreover, several Washington radio and television stations can easily be
heard in Baltimore. To uphold plaintiff's contentions would
necessarily mean that any Washington newspaper or radio
or television station advertising products below Maryland
fair trade prices could be prevented from so doing, because
said advertising is within Maryland. These consequences
are not peculiar to Washington alone. In the Fourth Circuit
there are three free trade states,29 and the number of fair
trade states in the country is rapidly decreasing.8 0 Further,
the mail order business is an integral part of the country's
economy."' Consider also the implications of an opposite
decision if defendant advertised in a national magazine at
less than Maryland Fair Trade prices. These problems not
only raise a question of Congressional intent to bestow such
broad powers upon the state without express grant, but
also require consideration of the difficulty of controlling
the spillage of communications into fair trade states.
It is possible that fair trade statutes of other states may
be construed to apply to advertising into its jurisdiction.
In that event, the question of the full meaning of Section 4
of the McGuire Act will have to be met. A more binding interpretation of the extent of this federal act is still
wanting.
MARTnN

B. GREENFELD

'3 Supra, n. 23.
2 District of Columbia, Virginia, and South Carolina. The District of
Columbia never had a fair trade statute. The fair trade statutes of -the
other two jurisdictions were declared unconstitutional by the highest courts
of their respective states. CCII Trade Reg. Rep. Vol. I, par. 3003, p. 4031-32.
By 1957, there were 32 states whose fair trade laws were applicable
to nonsigners. Observe, however, that in 1955-56 twelve other states had
held unconstitutional or invalidated their entire acts or the sections binding nonsigners. Florida had done the same in 1954; Michigan, in 1952.
CCIH Trade Reg. Rep. Vol. II, par. 10,202.03 et 8eq., p. 20,201 et seq.
'a For an excellent article on the position of mail order houses in America's
economy, see Spielvogel, More Stores Join Mail Order Field, New York
Times, November 18, 1956. It is pointed out that there are 15,000 mall
order concerns in the nation, and the estimated sales volume this year of
the major companies alone will be 3% 'billion dollars.

